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Hinduism as a dharmic faith in relation to the concepts of truth (satyam) and its
opposite (anṛtam), without however expatiating on supposed contrasts between
Hinduism and the “Abrahamic” faiths. The argument is conducted by recognizing
two senses to anṛtam, namely, “non-truth” and “falsehood,” in contrast to satyam;
and the method used is inductive in that a historically well-known episode of the
Mahābhārata—the story of Kaus´ika and the bandits—and its authoritative inter-
pretation by the deity Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a in terms of satyam and anṛtam (in the Karṇaparvan,
Book 8, of the text) are analyzed heuristically to indicate how dharma is viewed in
the tradition qua ethical concept. The conclusion is drawn that Hindu dharma is
understood as that whose objective is ultimately to bring about the welfare of the
world (lokasaṅgraha). In relation to truth (and its opposite), materially, dharma is
invariably contextual in connotation (in contrast to what might be a Kantian or
absolutist reading of moral imperatives), whereas formally, at the hands of one
commentator or other, not least in modern times, dharma is that which defines what
it means to be Hindu. The material and formal connotations of dharma thus ana-
lyzed and taken together set Hinduism apart qua dharmic faith.
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The official motto for the Indian state, adopted in 1950, is satyam eva jayate.1 This
declaration may be translated as “Truth alone conquers,” or perhaps “Truth alone
prevails.” Apparently, the state’s founding fathers wished to put the pursuit of truth
at the heart of the new nation. Many important questions tied up with religious faith,
and political and social representation, underlie the choice of this motto in Sanskrit,
but these are beyond the scope of this article. Here we focus on the declaration of
the aspiration itself, which we can suppose most factions concerned would not have
objected to qua aspiration. It appears in theMuṇḍaka Upaniṣad, generally dated to a
few centuries before the Common Era. The declaration’s meaning becomes clearer
when we take it in context. The Muṇḍaka (3.1.1) is speaking of two closely bound
companions, one immersed in the experiences of life, the other a witness. When the
experiencer eventually becomes a sage (yati) by disengaging one’s self from the
multiple attachments of everyday life through the pursuit of truth, austerity, right
knowledge, and purity (3.1.5), then it is the companion, the divine witnessing self,
that becomes the constant source of attention and delight. It is at this point that our
text comes into play, which I translate as follows:
Truth (satyam) alone conquers, not untruth (anṛtaṃ). By truth (satyena) the
path leading to the Divine is spread out, by which the seers, their desires
fulfilled, approach That which is the highest abode of truth-and-being
(satyasya) (3.1.6).2
There are a couple of features of the Sanskrit here that are noteworthy for our
purposes. First, in general, satyam can be translated as both “truth” and “being” or
“reality,”3 while anṛtam—the negative of ṛtam—can be translated as “non-truth,”
and also as “untruth” or “falsehood,” or even as “non-real” or “unreal” (the negative
being susceptible of both the stronger and weaker senses of this term). This
derives from a longstanding grammatical rule in Sanskrit whereby the (negative)
1 This paper was first presented at the Backwaters Collective on Metaphysics and Politics conference at
Cochin, India in July 2018. I am grateful for the discussion that followed and especially for comments by
Professors Ganesh N. Devy, D. Venkat Rao, and Ajay Skaria. “Hinduism” no doubt is a problematic term,
but I have argued in the past for retaining it as a marker of identity for culture, faith, and follower. If there
are, conventionally, “Christians,” “Buddhists,” and “Muslims,” then there are “Hindus.” Similarly, if
there are “Christian,” “Buddhist,” and “Muslim” texts, then there are also “Hindu” texts. With reference
to texts and other sources cited, I hope I am using this descriptor in a pragmatically acceptable and
uncontroversial way.
2 satyam eva jayate nānṛtaṃ, satyena panthā vitato devayānaḥ | yenākramanty ṛṣayo hy āptakāmā, yatra
tat satyasya paramaṃ nidhānam || (Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 3.1.6).
3 This is why I have translated the final satyam of 3.1.6 as “truth-and-being.”
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prefix “a-/an-” becomes susceptible of a range of meanings.4 The ambiguity—and
in the case of anṛtam here, also ambivalence—of these meanings are significant for
our purposes, with context being our guide for what the sense might be in one
occurrence or other of the term.
Second, note the juxtaposition of satyam and anṛtam in our text. This particular
verbal face-off is not uncommon in Sanskrit literature, as we shall see. We can now
expand a little on these points to clarify the course of our argument.
On satyam as connoting both “truth” and “reality/being,” let us consider briefly a
portion of the great Advaitin, or non-dualist, S´an˙kara’s (eighth-century) interpre-
tation of a statement from the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (perhaps a couple of centuries
earlier than the Muṇḍaka). The Taittirīya starts as follows with reference to the
Supreme Being, Brahman:
Om
˙
. The knower of Brahman obtains the Supreme. On that, this has been said:
“Brahman isBeing/Truth (satyaṃ),Knowledge (jñānam), Eternal (anantaṃ)…”
(2.1.1).5
We need not concern ourselves with all the exegetical details.6 However when
explaining satyam here, S´an˙kara says:
With respect to satyam we say: that whose form (or nature, rūpa) is known for
certain as undeviating, is satyam, whereas that whose form (or nature) is
ascertained as deviating, is said to be anṛtam. Hence change (vikāra) is
anṛtam.…So, “Brahman is satyam” means that Brahman resiles from change
[that is, Brahman is unchanging] (1964: 283; my translation).7
Note both the verbal and conceptual confrontation here between satyam and anṛtam
in S´an˙kara’s explanation. But how to translate these terms? Because of S´an˙kara’s
4 Matilal notes: “The symbol ‘nañ’ stands, in general, for all the negative particles in Sanskrit. Thus the
free particles ‘na,’ ‘no,’ etc., and the bound particles ‘a-’ and ‘an-’ in compounds [for example, anrṭa] are
included under this general name.…The following couplet is quoted by the grammarians to enumerate the
six senses in which the particle ‘nañ’ is used in compounds: ‘tat-sādṛśyam abhāvaś ca tad-anyatvaṃ tad-
alpatā, aprāśastyaṃ virodhaś ca nañ-arthāḥ ṣaṭ prakīrtitāḥ’ [which I translate as: “Similarity to its
(counterpositive) and absence of it, difference from it and scarcity of it, criticism (of it) and opposition (to
it): these are the six established senses of nañ (the negative prefix)].” He continues with examples of each
sense: “(i) similarity, as in ‘a-brāhmaṇaḥ (like a brahmin)’; (ii) (relational) absence, as in ‘a-pāpam
(absence of sin)’; (iii) difference or mutual absence, as in ‘an-aśvaḥ (other than a horse)’; (iv) smallness
or scarcity, as in ‘an-udarā kanyā (a girl with a thin waist)’; (v) impropriety, as in ‘a-paśavo’nye (other
animals are ill-suited [for the sacrifice in question]’; (vi) contrariety, as in ‘a-dharmaḥ (contrary to merit,
demerit)’ ” (1968: 148). These examples of the negative prefix in compounds are well known and are
given, for example, by Kaun
˙
d
˙
abhat
˙
t
˙
a (ca. first half of the seventeenth century) in his Vaiyākaraṇabhū-
ṣaṇasāra in the Nañarthanirṇaya chapter (see Kaun
˙
d
˙
abhat
˙
t
˙
a 1957: 360. I am grateful to Professor Varun
Khanna for locating this reference for me). For our purposes, we focus on the senses of anṛtam as
“absence of truth” and as “contrary to truth”; the former, as we shall go on to explain, does not imply
falsehood, while the latter does.
5 oṃ | brahmavidāpnoti param | tadeṣābhyuktā | satyaṃ jñānamanantaṃ brahma… | (Taittirīya Upaniṣad
2.1.1).
6 On this, see my “S´an˙kara on Satyaṃ Jñānam Anantaṃ Brahma” (Lipner 1997).
7 satyamiti yadrūpeṇa yanniścitaṃ tadrūpaṃ na vyabhicarati, tat satyam | yadrūpeṇa yanniścitaṃ
tadrūpaṃ vyabhicarad anṛtam ity ucyate | ato vikāro’nṛtaṃ… | ataḥ satyaṃ brahmeti brahma vikārān
nivartayati |
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preoccupation with “change” and “non-change,” we must plump here, I think, for
some such translation as “Reality” or “the Real” for satyam. So the meaning is,
because Brahman is unchanging in nature, It is the Real, or Reality itself. In that
case, anṛtam is what is unreal, that is, not truly real or existent; in other words,
because it changes it is not real per se in the way Brahman is Real. S´an˙kara goes on
to say that everything other than Brahman is unreal, or rather, real only in so far as it
depends on Brahman for its causal being.
But there is a subtlety to S´an˙kara’s use of words. Vyabhicar-, namely, the verbal
root S´an˙kara uses in the first instance for “change,”8 can also refer to a process of
moral deviation from some norm, like a transgression or sin,9 or even to inflicting
harm or injury. This lets in the connotation of “Truth” for satyam, and “untruth” or
“falsehood” for anṛtam, because we are speaking here of a moral deviation. The
alternative translation for S´an˙kara’s explanation would then have the sense of:
With respect to satyam we say: Brahman is Truth itself, because It has a form
or nature that is known for certain not to deviate [from what It is qua truth],
while that whose form or nature is ascertained as liable to fall away [from the
truth of its being], is said to be anṛtam. Hence change in the sense of liability
to fall away in a moral sense is anṛtam.…So, “Brahman is satyam” means that
Brahman is Truth itself.
S´an˙kara’s careful interpretation of this Upaniṣad is one of the earliest commentaries
we have, so—his Advaitic leanings apart—perhaps we can assume that, taking his
cue from theMuṇḍaka, his verbal and moral association of satyam and anṛtam was a
common enough juxtaposition in discursive contexts by his time (we shall see that it
appears, earlier, often in the Mahābhārata) and his reading of ambiguity (and,
where relevant, ambivalence) in satyam and anṛtam was commonly also that of
other Hindu thinkers, irrespective of their philosophical or theological points of
view.
Now, if I must express a preference, then I would say that I prefer the first,
largely ontological, interpretation as a direct translation and I would admit that the
second sounds somewhat forced—yet there is no doubt that vyabhicar does have the
connotation of being morally deviant in some way, which gives plausibility to
understanding S´an˙kara’s explanation as signifying, perhaps obliquely, Brahman’s
identification with absolute Truth and Brahman’s opposition to moral deviation.10
Or, to look at it somewhat differently, we can say from this understanding of
S´an˙kara’s interpretation that truth is a supreme value or good in so far as it is
identified with the Absolute and that its opposite, anṛtam, namely, untruth or
falsehood or moral instability or deviance, is to be shunned. Further, by virtue of
8 That is, change for the worse, a falling away from a stable state. His later use of vikāra indicates that he
has instability in the ontological sense primarily in mind, but this does not imply that he does not also
have a “defection,” a falling away in a moral sense, also in mind. Hence our alternative translation.
9 Thus, the dictionary notes that the noun form vyabhicāra can also mean a crime or sin (such as a wife’s
infidelity).
10 A number of translators of this text render satyam as “Truth” rather than as “Reality” or “the Real.”
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this selfsame identification, the pursuit of truth leads to fullness of being for us as
human beings (cf. Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 3.1.6).11 To say that this conception was
commonly held by Hindu thinkers does not seem to be a contentious conclusion to
draw from the sources we have considered. In other words, a lot was at stake for
becoming fully and “truly” human through the pursuit of truth. For such pursuit
leads us to our final destination (3.1.6). We must now inquire further into this
supreme Hindu value. With the title of this article in mind, then, we can now ask
“what is truth?” and consider how it relates to what is not the truth (anṛtam), in the
context of that central Hindu concept—dharma. Our objective is modest: to devise
some understanding of what it might mean to say that Hinduism is a “dharmic” faith
in relation to the concept of truth, or to put it differently, to provide a claimant for
saying that Hinduism is a “dharmic” faith in terms of “truth.”12 Note, our approach
is “inductive” in the sense that, for the most part, we shall be referring to an
influential text with heuristic properties (including an illustrative example as shown
below) ostensibly promulgated by an influential figure (the divine avatāra, Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a),
located in a source that has had considerable traction in one form or another among
a broad swathe of Hindus down the ages (namely, the Mahābhārata), to offer a
suggestion as to how Hinduism may be considered a dharmic faith in relation to the
concept of “truth.” It is open to the reader to challenge this suggestion by producing
counterexamples; but then, how many counterexamples could overturn our
suggestion? In other words, what is the critical mass of counterexamples that
would militate against what we claim is a trend in Hindu understanding? That is the
question. On the other hand, if most Hindus who read or follow our argument accept
our suggestion, then the suggestion stands. Let us now continue with our discussion.
As is well known, dharma in Hinduism has multiple meanings13; but in all cases
as a moral term, dharma bears semantically on “what ought to be done (kartavya),”
and by implication (negatively), on “what ought to be avoided (akartavya)” or
“what ought not to be done.” Dharma as a moral term presides over the domains of
“oughtness” and “prohibition.” In this connection, I have pointed out in my book,
Hindus, that
the actualization of dharma is traditionally understood to require a free and
deliberate response…[by the agent, as is] indicated by its definition in an
influential text, the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra of Jaimini (200 B.C.E.–200 C.E.). The
second verse of this text declares: “Dharma concerns some directive” (codanā
11 With the exception of the “materialists” (Ca¯rva¯kas) and kindred schools, all the foundational schools
of Hindu thought acknowledged the scriptural authority of the Vedas (which included the Upanis
˙
ads).
12 We shall not be concerned with the contrast often made between Hinduism as a dharmic faith and the
so-called Abrahamic faiths. In any case, this is a simplistic contrast and overlooks important distinctions
between the Abrahamic faiths themselves. On occasion, however, where it might prove useful, we shall
venture a passing comment on aspects of this contrast. For an instructive treatment of differences within
and between the Abrahamic faiths, with historical implications, see Abulafia 2018.
13 Matilal, in an essay entitled, “Elusiveness and Ambiguity in Dharma-Ethics” (2002b), observes, “In
various contexts, the word dharma may mean: law, justice, custom, morality, ethics, religion, duty,
nature, or virtue” (37), to which we may add “propriety” and “righteousness.” He goes on to say, “[The]
almost breathtaking complexity…of the dharma-concept seems to underline links between ways of living,
ways of seeing and ways of relating to life’s ultimate issues” (37).
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lakṣaṇo’rtho dharmaḥ).…The point is…that according to this definition,
dharmic behavior has to do with a recommended course of action. Such a
directive would paradigmatically be expressed in Sanskrit in the optative
mood (vidhi-liṅ), i.e. “One should/may (not) do so-and-so.” This would make
no sense unless it were assumed that the subject of the directive was free to act
accordingly (Lipner 2010: 251; emphasis in original).14
This is sufficient for us now to usher in a change of scene and turn to the
Mahābhārata.
It is generally agreed by scholars that the received text of this great Sanskrit
epic—we shall focus on the so-called critical or Poona edition—was produced over
a period of time between about the fifth century BCE and about the fifth century CE
(give or take a century or two either way).15 The Mahābhārata is well known as a
repository of seminal ideas for shaping the understanding of Hindu morality, or
dharma, all of which were bound up with a host of myths, tales, anecdotes, fables—
call them what you will—which collectively functioned as a veritable laboratory of
thought-experiments for discerning the nature of dharma, understood as that which
ought to be done, or the righteous course of action, in a particular situation.16 Many
of these stories exist as frame-stories or as components of frame-stories, which
indicates that the text as a whole was remarkably self-aware. In other words, the
text’s anecdotal nature tends to generate reflective discussion. From our point of
view, an integral part of this process is distinguishing between truth and what is not
truth and what it means to be a truthful human being. This distinction, I shall argue,
lies at the heart of what it might mean to call traditional Hinduism a dharmic faith.17
It is not by accident, I think, that the declaration, satyam eva jayate, was chosen as
the motto of the new nation-state that was India, a country that was then, and still is,
statistically, overwhelmingly Hindu in population. We can now move on to consider
the nature of satyam—a key marker, as we have indicated, not only of the Absolute,
but also of the pathway to attaining It—with the Mahābhārata as a preeminently
Hindu text as our guide.
14 How the pursuit of dharma fits in with the teaching on karma and rebirth is an interesting but separate
question.
15 In my view, properly speaking, there can be no such thing as a “critical edition” of the Mahābhārata,
which began life as an oral text subject to the dynamics of oral transmission over time. We take recourse
in this article to the so-called critical Sanskrit Poona version then only in so far as it is a conveniently
available and stable reference text.
16 Because of its polemical character, not least about the nature of dharma, a copy of theMahābhārata is
not kept in traditional Hindu households, for the belief is that this would lead to dissension among the
inhabitants of the house. This does not mean that certain episodes or discourses of the Mahābhārata have
not acquired a generally acknowledged authority in Hindu perceptions with the passage of time, as we
shall see. Dharma is also at the heart of that other great Sanskrit epic, the Rāmāyaṇa, namely, “The
coming of (the human avatāra) Ra¯ma (into the world),” but in a subtly different way. The dharma of the
Rāmāyaṇa, especially with regard to Ra¯ma’s character, seems to imply a more settled understanding of
dharma than that of the Mahābhārata, a major objective of which appears to be to encourage inquiry into
the nature of dharma.
17 “Traditional Hinduism,” because, as I hope will become plain by the end of this article, this does not
apply to those forms of (contemporary) Hinduism that depart from this model.
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We need not concern ourselves with summarizing the main plot (and labyrinthine
subplots) of the narrative18—let us begin, rather, in medias res. A great battle is
being fought between two mighty armies; at the head of each is a group of warriors
who are related to the opposing group as cousins. So, up to a point, we have a text
here about an internecine war, with its ubiquitous moral deliberations or
pronouncements all the more poignant and consequential for that. One of these
groups is a family of five brothers, known as the Pa¯n
˙
d
˙
avas, the eldest of whom is
called Yudhis
˙
t
˙
hira. At one point, when he sees that the battle is not going well and
that his brother Arjuna, noted for his prowess, has been unable to slay Karn
˙
a, a great
general of the opposing side (whom Arjuna had promised Yudhis
˙
t
˙
hira he would kill:
mayi pratiśrutya, 8.48.3), Yudhis
˙
t
˙
hira berates Arjuna in no uncertain terms and, to
add insult to injury, suggests that Arjuna should have handed over his trusty bow,
Ga¯n
˙
d
˙
iva, to Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a, his charioteer (and also the avatāra of the Deity), who could
have finished the job (8.48.13–14).
This cuts Arjuna to the quick, who in response grabs his sword to kill his brother.
When Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a intervenes to stop him, Arjuna, still enraged, says that he has taken a
“secret vow” (upāmśuvrata) to cut off the head of anyone who insults him by saying
that he must make over Ga¯n
˙
d
˙
iva to another (8.49.9). He insists that he must keep his
promise (pratijñāṃ pālayiṣyāmi, 8.49.10), for thus he will attain freedom from debt
to the truth (satye’pyānṛṇyatāṃ gataḥ, 8.49.12).
As Bimal Krishna Matilal points out, “Promise-keeping is identified with
truthfulness in almost all cultures” (2002a: 9). But faced with the prospect of this
awful act, Arjuna now has second thoughts. On the one hand he must keep his vow,
and on the other hand he does not wish to kill his elder brother. In a bind, he looks
desperately to Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a for help, and asks: “What do you think is appropriate at this
time—you, my mentor, who know the entire past and present of this world? I’ll do
what you tell me to do, Sir” (8.49.13).19 This is the frame-episode for what follows.
Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a, to whom Arjuna humbly attributes superior, indeed omniscient, knowl-
edge, now embarks on a lecture about the nature of dharma, promise-keeping, and
truth.20 At the outset, note two features of this episode, one external to the narrative,
and the other internal: (a) externally, this episode has become well known in
subsequent Hindu deliberations about the nature of dharma and the ethics of
speaking the truth and promise-keeping (as we shall indicate in due course),
especially with regard to a particular illustrative anecdote attached to it; while
(b) internally, note how Arjuna refers to the need to attend to context in order to
18 A good, abridged English rendering of the story is given in Smith, The Mahābhārata (2009).
19 kiṃ vā tvaṃ manyase prāptam asmin kāle samutthite | tvam asya jagatas tāta vettha sarvaṃ gatāgatam ||
tat tathā prakariṣyāmi yathā māṃ vakṣyate bhavān || (Mahābhārata 8.49.13).
20 In his Kṛṣṇacaritra, “The Life of Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a,” first published in 1886, the doyen of early Bengali literature,
Bankimcandra Chatterji, discusses this section of the Mahābhārata (see the sixth chapter in Part 6,
entitled “Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
akathita Dharmatattva,” of the 1892 edition). This indicates the authoritative claims of this
section. Though on occasion similar points are made, our argument follows a different course from
Bankim’s (see later). Further, in places there is confusion in Bankim’s treatment of dharma, which is
understood sometimes as that which one ought to do and sometimes in the modern sense of “religion” or
“religious faith.”
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resolve his dilemma when he asks: “What do you think is appropriate (prāptam) for
me to do at this moment of time (asmin kāle samutthite).”
In his reply, Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a implicitly endorses Arjuna’s perception that a genuine
dilemma obtains (otherwise he would have simply instructed Arjuna to fulfill his
promise and kill Yudhis
˙
t
˙
hira, however personally abhorrent this might seem); but
Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a also acknowledges the need to take context into account, as we shall now seek
to demonstrate. Early in his discourse, Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a makes a point that is made repeatedly
in the Mahābhārata—that dharma is highly enigmatic, that it is subtle and full of
intricacy, and that it is very hard to discern in this situation or that (sūkṣma/-tā are
the terms often used to indicate this quality).21 As life’s situations become more
complicated, it requires a mature mind to do so, one attentive to the wisdom of the
past.
Associating dharma and truth-telling, Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a now instructs Arjuna (we give the
gist of his teaching):
No one who is aware of the distinctions (dharmavibhāga-) that make up
dharma, Arjuna, would act thus (8.49.14).…He is the basest of persons who
confuses what should and should not be done (8.49.15).…For it is not at all
easy to know what should and should not be done. It is only through proper
authority (śrutena) that all can be known and that you do not know (8.49.18).
…The virtuous person does not countenance the killing of living beings
(8.49.19). It is best, in my view, not to kill living beings. One can even speak a
non-truth (anṛtaṃ), but one should never kill (8.49.20).…(Why are you bent
on killing your elder brother then) without having resolved the subtle
(sūkṣmāṃ) and enigmatic (duranvayām) path of moral matters (dharmāṇāṃ)
(8.49.24)? I shall now reveal to you the secret of dharma… (8.49.25).
After insisting that it is very hard to discern what dharma is, that is, what should be
done, in a particular situation, and that one needs proper guidance to do this, Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a
exalts non-killing as the highest virtue, even over speaking the truth and not uttering
what is anṛtam. To make my argument clearer, I have translated anṛtam here as non-
truth, that is, as what is simply not the case, enforcing the distinction between the
meaning of anṛtam as “non-factual” or “not stating what is the case” and its
meaning as “untrue” or “false,” a distinction we are entitled to make according to
the authoritative grammatical rule mentioned earlier. Not to state a fact does not per
se imply a moral transgression, whereas a lie or falsehood seems to imply a moral
transgression by definition. A myth or a fairy-tale is non-factual (anṛtam in the
“weak” sense), but this does not make it a lie or a falsehood (anṛtam in the “strong”
sense). This is well understood by mature people. So I take it that Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a is saying
that you can prevaricate, or dissemble, or perhaps even be a bit devious by not
uttering what is the case to follow the code of non-violence and save a life. This
would not be a “lie” or a moral transgression. But does this mean that following the
code of non-violence is an unconditional requirement? That it cannot be violated
21 For another well-known episode, among many, stressing the need to discern dharma’s enigmatic
nature to arrive at the solution of a pressing dilemma, one can follow the narration of the dicing match in
Book 2 of the Mahābhārata. I have analyzed it at some length in my Hindus (2010: Chapter 11).
220 Julius Lipner
123
under any circumstances? Hardly—for this advice comes from the same Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a who
instructed Arjuna, in the Bhagavad Gītā, to follow his caste duty and as a righteous
Ks
˙
atriya engage in the very war in which this episode occurs, even if it meant
slaying his relatives and respected elders. There is such a thing as dharmic, or
righteous, (mortal) combat. What has entered the discussion here is the weighing up
of priorities in following a moral course of action. Speaking the truth, keeping one’s
word, not killing, are all dharmic, or moral, goods that need to be weighed up with
respect to each other in context before one decides on a moral course of action. This
will become clearer as Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a’s argument unfolds.
In order to endorse context as key to determining the relative merits of what seem
to be temporarily incompatible dharmic goods, Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a illustrates his teaching by
narrating two anecdotes. We shall concentrate on the second one, which, as I
mentioned earlier, is well known in subsequent Hindu deliberations about the ethics
of promise-keeping and truth-telling. After exalting truth, Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a first points to the
difficulty and subtlety of distinguishing between what is really the truth and what is
not:
Speaking the truth is virtuous (sādhu); nothing is higher than the truth
(satyam). But, in fact, it is very difficult to discern how speaking the truth
should be practised (8.49.27). And it can well be that [on occasion] the truth
must not be spoken, while what is not the truth (anṛtaṃ) should be uttered
(8.49.28).…Sometimes what is not the truth becomes “the truth,” while what
is the truth becomes untruth (anṛtaṃ). Only a simple-minded person (bāla)
sees truth as something to be practised thus [namely, at face-value or blindly].
But having distinguished truth [proper] from non-truth, one becomes a knower
of dharma (dharmavit) (8.49.29–30).22
Here Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a says that there is nothing higher than the truth (na satyād vidyate param,
8.49.27); but a little earlier he has said that in his view not taking life is the best
option (8.49.20). Clearly then one must adjudicate between these two goods when
the occasion arises, according to the circumstances in which one finds oneself. The
dramatic story of the Bra¯hman
˙
a ascetic Kaus´ika that he now relates will draw us
into the intricacies of this teaching not only intellectually, but also emotionally, that
is, qua human beings. This is what attention to context does; it counters the making
of automatic or mechanical decisions that a fortiori tend to occur in a morality that
relies on the absolutizing of moral principles. Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a’s teaching on the other hand
helps make our moral decisions properly human; by drawing us in as beings of
intellect and emotion (the latter has been gravely underrated in the determining of
moral principles), it becomes fit for human consumption, that is, fit for purpose.
After all, this is what illustrations that are relevant for our moral deliberations help
to achieve. They can humanize such deliberations, without necessarily being
allowed to sentimentalize them. And the Mahābhārata excels at providing such
illustrations. Let me then paraphrase, and in the process duly elaborate, the
illustration of Kaus´ika so as to give its proper moral role better effect.
22 yatrānṛtaṃ bhavet satyaṃ satyaṃ ca apy anṛtaṃ bhavet | (Mahābhārata 8.49.29). tādṛśaṃ paśyate
bālo yasya satyam anuṣṭhitam | satyānṛte viniścitya tato bhavati dharmavit || (8.49.30).
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Kaus´ika was a Bra¯hman
˙
a (vipra) ascetic (tapasvī) who lived at the confluence of
some rivers, not far from a village. But he was not very knowledgeable in the
authoritative texts (na bahuśrutaḥ).23 Once again, mention is made here of the need
to be attentive to authoritative tradition. But being attentive to (authoritative)
tradition is also a characteristic of taking context into account. In discerning
dharma, one cannot simply go it alone.
Now truth-telling was regarded as a special quality of Bra¯hman
˙
as. Recall the
story in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad about the youth Satyaka¯ma (4.4.1–5).24
Satyaka¯ma asked his mother, Jaba¯la¯, for permission to live as a student who
studied the Vedic scriptures and way of life (brahmacārin). For this he needed to
know his gotra, or family lineage, otherwise he would not be accepted by a
recognized teacher. But his mother answered that she did not know his gotra
because when she was young she moved around a lot as a serving girl and conceived
him without knowing who the father was. She advised Satyaka¯ma that he should
recount the circumstances of his birth to his prospective teacher, and then simply
state that his mother was called Jaba¯la¯ and he was Satyaka¯ma Ja¯ba¯la. Satyaka¯ma
approaches the teacher Gautama, and when asked about his gotra repeats what his
mother told him to say. And Gautama answers, “Someone who’s not a Bra¯hman
˙
a
could not speak like this.…I’ll take you on, my child, because you have not departed
from the truth.” So truth-telling, and by implication promise-keeping, were
particularly appropriate acts for good Bra¯hman
˙
as.
Kaus´ika endorses this perception by taking a vow (vrata): “I shall always tell the
truth (satyaṃ mayā sadā vācyam iti tasyābhavad vratam).” In fact, this made him
well known as a speaker of the truth (satyavādīti, 8.49.42). Two matters of note
here: (i) Kaus´ika took a vow to do what he was expected to do. Vratas could be
short-term or long-term,25 but there is no indication here that this was a temporary
resolution or that it was taken with some tangible end in view (both possible in the
taking of vows). On the contrary, it seems that Kaus´ika took his vow always to tell
the truth to fulfill expectations of him as a Bra¯hman
˙
a. (ii) But can one not detect
here an element of pride, perhaps even arrogance, in the words used to describe
Kaus´ika’s vow: satyaṃ mayā sadā vācyam: (literally) “the truth must always be
spoken by me.” There is a cadence to these words that seems to imply the following
accompanying awareness:
I am a Bra¯hman
˙
a, an ascetic who can strengthen his resolve by his austerities
[austerities were expected to achieve this], and I am famous for carrying out
my vow. Nothing must be allowed to pose a threat to this state of affairs.
23 kauśiko’py abhavad vipras tapasvī na bahuśrutaḥ | nadīnāṃ saṃgame grāmād adūre sa kilāvasat ||
(Mahābhārata 8.49.41).
24 “Satyaka¯ma” can be translated as “lover of truth.”
25 Pechilis observes that a vow (vrata) “can be long-term or short-term, constitutive or instrumental,
ontological or conditional, duty-bound or voluntary, directed toward a specific deity or aimed at
transforming one’s life path to increase one’s spiritual status—or, seemingly, almost any combination
thereof” (2006: 147, cited in Pintchman 2010: 427).
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The fact that he was not very knowledgeable in the authoritative tradition (na
bahuśrutaḥ) that could throw light on the conditions for keeping his promise, seems
to have eluded this awareness.26
To continue the story: it so happened that one day Kaus´ika saw a group of
terrified individuals enter the forest in which he dwelt. They were fleeing from a
band of bloodthirsty bandits. When their pitiless (krūrā) pursuers arrived on the
scene, they approached Kaus´ika and asked him if he knew where their quarry had
fled. The text makes a point of stating how the bandits questioned our truth-telling
Bra¯hman
˙
a. They said: “Asked in truth’s name (satyena pṛṣṭaḥ), speak if you know
where they’ve gone, and tell us!” (8.49.44). The text continues: “Questioned [thus],
Kaus´ika made a veridical statement to them (satyaṃ vacanaṃ tān uvāca),” and
revealed where their quarry were hiding: “They’ve taken refuge in this wood full of
dense trees and creepers” (8.49.45). Then their remorseless pursuers sought them
out and killed them all.
And now for the pièce de résistance of this anecdote: Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a concludes it by
saying:
As for Kaus´ika, by that immoral act (adharmeṇa), by that highly illspoken
word, he went to a ghastly hell. A fool, he was not knowledgeable enough of
the authoritative texts and unable to distinguish the realities of dharma
(8.49.46).
We may find this a surprising conclusion: apparently, our truth-telling Bra¯hman
˙
a
went to a particularly gruesome hell for keeping his vow! But Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a continues:
Dharma has been promulgated for the development (prabhavārthāya) of
beings (8.49.49). It’s said the term dharma comes from dhāraṇam, that is,
“maintaining,” “preserving.” So dharma sustains creatures (8.49.50).…
Therefore, speaking what is not true (anṛtam) for the sake of dharma, is not
a falsehood (anṛtam) (8.49.55).…Having heard this, Arjuna, tell me if [you
think] Yudhis
˙
t
˙
hira should be killed (8.49.56).27
In some way—which we shall investigate further—by parroting “the truth”
Kaus´ika deviated from the proper course of dharma, so that this resulted in
retribution. For his part, Arjuna decides not to honor his “secret promise” and kill
his brother. He realizes that he has made an unconsidered vow that ought not to be
26 In terms of Pechilis’ description (see previous note), Kaus´ika’s vrata seems to have been voluntary,
and therefore, speaking technically, kāmya (rather than nitya or naimittika), and undertaken to enhance his
“spiritual status,” but in a self-aggrandizing way; he didn’t bother to study what the expert guides had to
say.
27 …prabhavārthāya bhūtānāṃ dharmapravacanaṃ kṛtam | (Mahābhārata 8.49.49). dhāraṇād dharmam
ityāhur dharmo dhārayati prajāḥ | (8.49.50).…tasmād dharmārtham anṛtam uktvā nānṛtavāg bhavet ||
(8.49.55).…etacchrutvā brūhi pārtha yadi vadhyo yudhiṣṭhiraḥ || (8.49.56). Note how anṛta appears twice
in the penultimate sentence we have quoted, indicating that our translation is correct, that is, the first anṛta
must bear a different sense (namely, “what is excusably non-factual”) from the second (“falsehood”),
otherwise the sentence would end up as a self-contradiction. See further.
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carried out to the letter.28 We can now delve deeper into Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a’s pronouncement
(made more than once in the text’s narration of this incident) that on occasion, even
though truth is a supreme value, parroting what is “the truth” is really not speaking
the truth, but may even be regarded as untruth, and that saying what is not the truth
or non-factual is tantamount to telling the truth—so long as one has the intention,
and made the appropriate effort, to implement dharma. In other words, what is truth
proper, and true dharma, must be discerned according to circumstance. As the
Mahābhārata reiterates elsewhere:
In the inappropriate place and time, dharma is ascertained to be adharma. It is
agreed that [even] appropriating [something], anṛtaṃ, and violence [can be]
dharma, which is circumstantial (12.37.8).29
Our inquiry will be more effective if we now consider an opposing point of view
to Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a’s, famously maintained by one of the most influential Western moral
philosophers of modern times, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). One must not forget
that Kant’s thought emerged in what was still broadly a Christian conceptual
environment with Christian notions of God and morality, however multifaceted,
holding sway. We shall return to this consideration in due course, in connection with
the term “Abrahamic.”
In a short essay entitled, “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy,”30
published in 1797 as a rejoinder to an attack on his view by a French thinker named
Benjamin Constant, Kant considers a scenario remarkably similar to that about
Kaus´ika.31 Kant first recounts his opponent’s position as follows:
The moral principle “it is a duty to tell the truth” would, if taken
unconditionally and singly, make any society impossible. We have proof of
this in the very direct consequences drawn from this principle by a German
philosopher [that is, Kant], who goes so far as to maintain that it would be a
28 We need not pursue the text further. Though Arjuna acknowledges the impetuousness of his earlier
intention and refrains from killing Yudhis
˙
t
˙
hira, he is still keen to appear as one who has kept a promise.
So, in response to Arjuna’s request to salvage his “secret vow” in some way, Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a provides a figleaf of a
justification. He tells Arjuna to address Yudhis
˙
t
˙
hira disrespectfully, for, he says, such (temporary)
lowering of his elder brother’s dignity would be tantamount to Arjuna’s “killing” him! For our part, we
must focus on the punishment meted out to Kaus´ika for uttering his “truthful” statement to the bandits—
his consignment to a ghastly hell. For this is the point of the illustration.
29 ya eva dharmaḥ so’dharmo’deśe’kāle pratiṣṭhitaḥ | ādānam anṛtam hiṃsā dharmo vyāvasthikaḥ smṛtaḥ ||
(Mahābhārata 12.37.8). I am grateful to John D. Smith for locating this verse for me.
30 Also translated from the German in some publications as, “On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies for
Benevolent Motives.”
31 Had Kant heard some version of the Kaus´ika story, which prompted the formulation of his own
example? There appears to be no evidence to suggest this. But Kant’s was a period in which German
savants looked to the East for cultural inspiration, which strengthens the possibility that the Kaus´ika story
was available to him in some form. Or perhaps Kant’s example derived from the story of the prostitute
Rahab in the Bible, who hid two Israelite spies from hostile pursuers on the roof-terrace of her home in
Jericho, telling the pursuers that they had left her dwelling (cf. The Book of Joshua, Chapter 2). When the
Israelite army later sacked Jericho, Rahab and her extended family who had taken refuge in her house
were spared. I am grateful to Professor Robert P. Gordon for this suggestion.
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crime to lie to a murderer who asked us whether a friend of ours whom he is
pursuing has taken refuge in our house.
…It is a duty to tell the truth. The concept of duty is inseparable from the
concept of right. A duty is that on the part of one being which corresponds to
the rights of another. Where there are no rights, there are no duties. To tell the
truth is therefore a duty, but only to one who has a right to the truth. But no
one has a right to a truth that harms others (1996: 611, citing Constant 1797:
123, 124).
Note that Constant has understood Kant correctly in saying that Kant endorses truth-
telling as an absolute principle, susceptible of no exception, by the phrase
“unconditionally and singly.” He also links telling the truth with rights: one should
be told the truth only if one has a right to it. One has no right to the truth if, by
knowing it, one seeks to harm someone else. Indeed, continues Constant, society
cannot function if Kant’s principle is applied from very small instances to great. We
may exemplify this as follows: (a) (Knock! Knock!) “Who’s there?” “Peter. Is John
in?” (John is at home but doesn’t like Peter. Knowing this, John’s wife makes an
excuse:) “Afraid not. He’s out.” (b) (Knock! Knock!) “Who’s there?” “Peter. Is
John in?” (John, who’s at home, is terrified of Peter who is a gangster and means to
inflict serious harm on John. Knowing this, John’s wife answers:) “No, he’s away.”
Neither of these answers by John’s wife is morally acceptable to Kant. Both of
her flat denials, irrespective of whether the circumstances and consequences are
minor (example [a]) or serious (example [b]), are to be reckoned as moral
transgressions—as untruths or lies—and therefore as reprehensible. One could be
evasive, I suppose, if that were possible, but one cannot knowingly, flatly deny what
is the case, without transgressing morally. Any such conciliatory explanation for
both answers on behalf of John’s wife—such as “He’s not at home to you”—cannot
pass muster as morally permissible for Kant. Further, your being entitled to the truth
in both cases (even if you’re a prospective murderer) is unconditional; it is not
bound up with a question of rights, or what your own intentions—good or bad—
upon hearing the truth, happen to be. Kant responds to Constant’s critique as
follows:
Truthfulness in statements that one cannot avoid is a human being’s duty to
everyone, however great the disadvantage to him or to another that may result
from it…[for I] do wrong in the most essential part of duty in general by such
falsification, which can therefore be called a lie.…That is, I bring it about…
that statements (declarations) in general are not believed, and so too that all
rights which are based on contracts come to nothing and lose their force; and
this is a wrong inflicted on humanity generally (1996: 612; emphasis in
original).
There are a number of assumptions and assertions here. In the title of his reply Kant
uses the word “lie.” So, the conclusion is already assumed in the essay’s title, for the
term “lie” (and even the idiom “white lie”) invariably implies a moral transgression
(however minor). Kant loads the argument in favor of his conclusion from the start.
Further, he asserts, contrary to Constant, that by speaking even a minor non-truth
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(for him, an untruth, for example, “Thank you for your lecture the other day, which I
enjoyed”), one is breaking a basic societal contract: the expectation, or entitlement,
of always receiving the truth, irrespective of the circumstances, otherwise
“statements (declarations) in general…[would] not [be] believed, and so too…all
rights [,] which are based on contracts [,] come to nothing and lose their force”
(Kant 1996: 612).
But this is a counterintuitive, false, and puerile view. It is counterintuitive and
false because social intercourse allows for and encourages non-truths in many
usually trivial circumstances—“I’m afraid he’s not at home,” “Yes, I liked that tie
you wore the other day,” “What a charming hairstyle!”—as necessary conventions
for the functioning of a civilized and civil society. Every mature person knows and
expects this. Only children (and perhaps those with certain psychological disorders)
expect “the truth” in every social circumstance. But mature moral principles take
courteous excuses and non-truths into account. This is why Kant’s absolutizing of
the principle of truth-telling for every circumstance is puerile and explains why
Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a in his instruction declared that only a simple-minded person or a child (bāla)
parrots the truth or practices truth-telling at its face-value (tādṛśaṃ paśyate bālo
yasya satyam anuṣṭhitam, 8.49.30). Understanding what should and should not be
done in a particular circumstance is the mark of a mature moral person, and this
understanding is hard won—through good intentions and experience, being attentive
to the deliberations of the wise (elders), and grappling with the perhaps conflicting
pulls of the circumstances at hand.
No doubt, one cannot make non-factual excuses lightly. We do have the
obligation to state what is the case—to “tell the truth”—so far as this is possible.
Easy convenience, and selfish advantage, cannot be legitimate criteria for the
making of non-factual excuses and statements. This is why excuses must be made
judiciously. However, the running of a civilized society, and the avoidance of
unnecessarily offending or hurting others, must always loom large in our sights
when the need for an excuse arises. This leads us to the consideration of more
serious moral decisions and their consequences confronting us in difficult
circumstances, and for this we must return to the Kantian version of the Kaus´ika
story.
Here someone takes refuge in a friend’s house (with the friend’s knowledge)
seeking to escape an individual who intends to kill him. The prospective murderer
arrives at the house in search of his quarry, but the owner of the house says that he is
not there. Not only is this a lie, and thus morally reprehensible, for Kant, but he goes
on to make the incredible claim that:
If you have by a lie prevented someone just now bent on murder from
committing the deed, then you are legally accountable for all the consequences
that might arise from it.…If you had lied and said that he is not at home, and
he has actually gone out (though you are not aware of it), so that the murderer
encounters him while going away and perpetrates his deed on him, then you
can by right be prosecuted as the author of his death.…One who tells a lie,
however well disposed he may be, must be responsible for its consequences
even before a civil court and must pay the penalty for them, however
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unforeseen they may have been; for truthfulness is a duty that must be
regarded as the basis of all duties to be grounded on contract, the law of which
is made uncertain and useless if even the least exception to it is admitted
(1996: 612–13; underline emphasis added).
Once again, even when the consequences for not telling the truth are serious, we
have a defensive statement—hardly an “argument”—that is counterintuitive, false,
and puerile. To begin with, it is doubtful if there is any legal system that regards it as
legitimate to prosecute someone as the author of a murder willingly committed by
someone else that was based on what was known to be the unintended consequences
of a benevolent lie meant, in the first instance, to prevent that murder, and it strikes
me as irrational to postulate that this should be so. Kant’s position rests, of course,
on his assumption that if you allow a single exception to telling the truth, then the
whole edifice of society, which he asserts depends on truthfulness as the basis of all
duties grounded on contract, is undermined. But we have seen above that, to the
contrary, a civilized society makes provision for what we may call excuses or non-
truths for its smooth functioning, and it is expected that this is understood by all
mature stakeholders of that society. A view to the contrary is simplistic, childish,
and immature (bāla).32 A small crack can result in a major breach, and this, it seems
to me, is what Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a has done to Kant’s argument. By implying that there can be
even small exceptions to the latter, Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a has demonstrated its fatal weakness.
It is not irrelevant that when, towards the mid-nineteenth century, a debate arose
between a traditional Bra¯hman
˙
a paṇḍita, Nı¯lakan
˙
t
˙
ha Goreh, and a Christian
evangelical-minded polemicist, John Muir, as to which faith, the Hindu or the
Christian, was doctrinally superior—for Muir had initiated the debate by arguing in
his Sanskrit treatise, the Mataparīkṣā (The Sifting of Doctrine), that Christian
doctrine was the more reasonable—Goreh, in his reply (the Śāstratattvavinirṇaya, or
“Determining the Essence of Scripture”), could argue as follows:
A divine scripture is profound, with a meaning beyond the scope of human
reasoning (nṛtarkāgocarārthavat).…If your doctrine [however] were to be
subjected to proper scrutiny by intelligent people, itswholemeaningwould seem
to have been uttered by simpletons (bhāti sarvaṃmugdhoditārthakam). Clearly,
32 Kant goes on to reason unconvincingly to justify his stance: “It is still possible that, after you have
honestly answered ‘yes’ to the murderer’s question as to whether his enemy is at home, the latter has
nevertheless gone out unnoticed, so that he would not meet the murderer and the deed would not be done.
…[If] you had told the truth to the best of your knowledge, then neighbors might have come and
apprehended the murderer while he was searching the house for his enemy and the deed would have been
prevented” (1996: 612–13). What is the point of these tortuous hypotheticals? They do not affect the
substance of Kant’s position. One can only say that they were introduced in the hope of mitigating the
implausibility of his view. It is also the case that some Kantian scholars recognize the outlandish nature of
this essay of Kant’s and press an argument that distinguishes between the moral principle that Kant is
advocating which is absolute, namely, one must never lie, and its application, which may well have
exceptions. But this distinction belies Kant’s own uncompromising words and argument (not to mention
his tortuous hypotheticals). In any case, I am making a pedagogical contrast here between Kant’s
argument and Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a’s to emphasize the incompatibility of both positions.
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your whole teaching has a sense that is puerile (bāladhīgocarārthakam),
seemingly created by men in conformity with their own intellect.33
A different argument in a different context, but the accusation is the same: Western/
Christian reasoning is simplistic, puerile (bāladhīgocara), lacking in profundity.
The truth is much more complex, not susceptible to being relayed blindly via
inflexible moral fiats.34 The role of reason is to try and make sense of “deep truth.”
But is not truth in its religious and moral dimensions, when drawn from the so-
called Abrahamic faiths of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—“Abrahamic” at least
in this: that they derive from a common spiritual ancestor, the prophet Abraham—
generally perceived as being particularly susceptible to promulgation by imposed
commandment, decree, or law, first by the Supreme Law Giver, and then by “His”
authorized and authoritative representatives, where, if context is to play a part in the
interpretation of such injunction, it is forever subject to the word as implacably
“revealed”? I am speaking here of a matter of perception rather than of judicious
discernment, in order simply to begin to explain what has become a current, popular
disjunction supposedly between two different kinds of faith. But it is as well to seek
to draw out this contrast here so that it may, perhaps in subsequent discussions, be
subjected to more careful scrutiny.
But to continue our analysis of Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a’s discourse with reference to what we may
call the determinacy of context, there are other values/goods than telling the truth in
the moral repertoire, that are not obviously to be subjected to the preeminence of
truth-telling, and whose aim is also the building up and maintenance of a “good”
social nexus, such as non-killing and not injuring (ahiṃsā); these also work towards
the welfare and nurture of others (which one can admit Kant had in mind too). With
this objective in view, such moral goods are at least as basic as truth-telling and
promise-keeping. This becomes particularly obvious when the stakes are much
higher, as in the case of Kaus´ika and that of Kant’s murderous felon.
Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a stresses this point. He has adverted to ahiṃsā as serving the underlying,
nurturing purpose of dharma and as at least equally fundamental for the cultivation
of morality and the establishment of society. Matilal pursues this point in his
consideration of the Kaus´ika episode. Paraphrasing Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a’s teaching, he writes:
33 My translation of the Sanskrit in transliteration given in Young 1981: footnotes 102 and 104 on pages
106 and 108, respectively.
34 Goreh maintained this stance even when, after a few years of writing this treatise, to general
consternation, he converted to Christianity! It was not so much a conversion to doctrine as a conversion to
the person of Christ. Goreh argued later only that Christian teaching was more reasonable than Hindu
teaching, not that reason could satisfactorily justify one’s faith. He never accepted Muir’s claim that the
mark of the true religion was its clear conformability to reason. Reason can only act within a faith-stance;
faith leads reason by the hand, reason grasping faith where it may. Thus, he did not repudiate or need to
repudiate his earlier indictment that Christian teaching was simple-minded and rationally not up to it. His
argument was now that Hindu teaching was rationally even less up to it! Yet with the passage of time, his
discomfort in his new beliefs and his inability to abandon the embedded traces of his old faith plunged
him into anguish. He is reported to have said, with reference to his conversion, that he often “felt like a
man who has taken poison,” acknowledging, “I have begun to think that it is not by going through a
regular process of reason that men renounce one religion and embrace another, though such was certainly
the case with me, and that is the very reason why my faith in Christianity [not Christ] is so poor” (Young
1981: 171, 172).
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[Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a] said that when Kaus´ika died, he did not go to heaven…for he had put
his selfish religious dogma over the selfless, morally admirable action. Truth-
telling may be morally admirable and hence certainly a religious virtue, but
not under all conditions. One of the certain marks of morally superior (and in
my scheme, “religiously” superior) action is its non-self-regarding character,
as philosophers in the Kantian tradition have no doubt emphasized (Matilal
2002a: 9; emphasis added).
We may discount here Matilal’s somewhat idiosyncratic use of the term “religious”
(which he himself seems to admit). Like us, he wishes primarily to make a moral
point. Dharma exists for the welfare of the moral agent in the wider context of the
welfare of social living (and indeed, the world). And for dharma to bear fruit, it
must ultimately inculcate other-regarding action over, and if necessary against,
one’s own personal gain or advantage. For this, discernment of the contesting pulls
of dharma in a particular situation is necessary. Dharma, enigmatic and subtle as it
is, is contextual in a mature moral system. Further, to discern the right course of
action requires consultation with those who are knowledgeable in dharma’s ways
(as Arjuna shows, to his credit, by consulting Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a in his dilemma).
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Kaus´ika example was taken up
again by two well-known Hindu thinkers, one reaching the end of his career, the
other in the earlier stages of his. The former was the doyen of Bengali novelists at
the time and an influential commentator on Hindu social and moral traditions in the
context of modernity, Bankimcandra Chatterji (1838–1894), who considered the
episode in his tract, The Life of Kṛṣṇa. The other was the Bengali poet and essayist,
Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), who went on to win the Nobel Prize for
literature. In his discussion of the Kaus´ika anecdote, Bankim does not directly
mention Kant or his stance in his reply to Constant.35 Bankim considers the option
of Kaus´ika remaining silent, which he finds acceptable. But then he considers the
possibility that the bandits did not allow this and forced Kaus´ika to speak by torture
and so forth—what then? Bankim continues:
Then some might say that Kaus´ika should maintain his silence, even at the
expense of torture and death. And we are prepared to accept this entirely. But
then the question arises: is it possible for this kind of dharma to be followed
generally in the world?…I do not think that the promulgation of such a
dharma would bear fruit. If it did, the human race would be extremely
fortunate.…So then what should one do? Knowingly tell the truth and abet the
killing of human beings? Whoever thinks dharma should be thus, their view of
dharma whether it be correct or not, is certainly an extremely cruel one
(Chatterji 1941: 226).
35 See Note 20 for the reference. In narrating the story, there is an important difference in Bankim’s
reading of the text and ours. Bankim writes: “There was a Bra¯hman
˙
a, Kaus´ika by name, who excelled in
austerities and was well versed in the scriptures (bahuśruta)…” (Chatterji 1941: 226). The Poona critical
edition of the Mahābhārata, on which we have relied, has: “na bahuśrutaḥ,” that is, “who was not well
versed in the scriptures” (8.49.41). This contrasts well with Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a’s insistence that in determining dharma
one should consider the guidance of the experts, and which we have emphasized consequentially in our
own analysis. Bankim’s reading emasculates the reason for Kaus´ika’s retribution.
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Throughout his discussion about Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a’s teaching, Bankim speaks in terms of
contrasting truth (satya) with falsehood or a lie (mithyā). When the welfare of others
is at stake, he argues, then dharma comes into play, and when this happens, the
“truth” can become a lie, and vice versa.
This is Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a’s own position: depending on the circumstance, truth (satya)
becomes falsehood (mithyā) and falsehood (mithyā) becomes truth (satya), and
in all those instances, [where appropriate] it is falsehood that must be
implemented.…Whatever is in accordance with dharma is in fact the truth,
and whatever is not so, is falsehood. Therefore, whatever benefits everyone is
the truth, while what does not do so, is falsehood. In this sense, truth in
common parlance (jāhā laukik satya) may be falsehood from the dharmic
point of view, and what is falsehood in common parlance may, from the
dharmic viewpoint, be truth. In this way, depending on circumstance,
falsehood takes on the form of truth (satyasvarūp) and truth takes on the form
of falsehood (mithyāsvarūp) (Chatterji 1941: 224, 225–26).
In the Bengali journal Bhāratī, Rabindranath at first disputed this view and
embraced the Kantian stance. In Matilal’s translation of the Bengali, he affirmed:
“Falsehood can never be true under any circumstances—even if respected
Bankimbabu or S´rı¯kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a himself says it can be” (2002a: 9),36 though, as Matilal
points out, “Rabindranath changed his view later” (11)! However, Bankim’s is not
our interpretation of Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a’s view. I do not think that by endorsing the speaking of
anṛtam as “non-truth” in certain circumstances, Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a is advising Arjuna to commit
a moral transgression, that is, to commit anṛtam in its sense of “falsehood,” perhaps
as the lesser of two evils. I have sought to show this by appealing to the semantic
ambiguity that the word anṛta is capable of harboring. Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a is saying that, when
dharma (and the wider good of others) is at stake, even by a flat denial of what one
knows to be the case, morally one is telling a non-truth rather than an untruth; or, to
put it differently, morally one’s flat denial is equivalent to a non-truth rather than a
lie (which in any case is reprehensible), so that one is not guilty of a moral
transgression. Further, one could not agree with Matilal’s suggestion here that, “It
may be that Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a…gave a pragmatic solution depending upon the situational
constraints” (2002a: 9). Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a is not making a pragmatic recommendation, which
again might well seek to justify a moral transgression, perhaps as the lesser of two
transgressions. Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a is saying that under certain conditions what would otherwise
pass for the truth, ceases to be so, because other necessary conditions for its being
the truth have not been met, for example the welfare or the preservation of the life of
the innocent, the wellbeing of the wider community, etc. These other (relevant)
conditions would all work for the maintenance and propagation of dharma which
has the welfare of the whole (not necessarily only human beings in the Hindu view
of things) in its purview. This is why moral deliberation implies an “organic” frame
of mind, intending the welfare of the whole order of being, in the light of the
guiding wisdom of the past (so far as this is known).
36 Citing Rabindranath Tagore in Bhāratī, Agraha¯yan
˙
a, BS 1291 [November–December, GC 1884], page
347.
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Hindu tradition has accented the need for moral deliberation in this way amid the
competing pulls of dharma from early times. Dharma is inclusive and multifaceted,
taking in divergent aspects of life. There are the particular dharmas of the caste-
orders and birth-groups (varṇa-dharma and jāti-dharma, respectively); the dharma
of phases of life: that of the student (brahmacarya), householder (gṛhastha), and so
on; dharma with particular relevance to the female gender (strī-dharma); dharma
for the time of danger and adversity (āpad-dharma), which, once again, accentuates
context by lifting the obligations of other kinds of dharma in such circumstances;
sādharaṇa-dharma, or the dharma that is applicable to all members of society
(namely, practicing truth, non-injury, honesty, control of the senses, etc.), and so on.
These dharmas are laid out in various kinds of dharma texts (dharmaśāstras) and
have been revised, commented upon, and discussed in both Sanskrit and the
vernacular down the ages.37 Theoretically, the tradition requires that when one is
confronted by competing dharmic obligations one must weigh up the relevant
dharmas before making a decision. Referring to an early and influential dharma
code, that of Manu (ca. beginning of the Common Era), which is still invoked as
representative of this tradition, Matilal points out:
In the case of dispute over dharma, where it is not easy to decide which course
of action should be followed.…Manu suggested [in Chapter 12, verse 110]
…“An assembly of not less than ten persons, or (if ten are not available) not
less than three persons, should deliberate and reach a decision on dharma, and
that dharma (thus arrived at) should not be transgressed” (2002c: 59–60).38
By this weighing up of competing dharmas in a particular situation, one has the
best chance of discerning what should be done (kartavya) and what shouldn’t
(akartavya). Thus Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a could advise Arjuna in the Bhagavad Gītā (which Arindam
Chakrabarti describes as “the central Hindu text of practical ethics, theology and
metaphysics” [2018: 19])39 that if he acted disinterestedly, without self-centered
gains in mind, that is, if he acted through niṣkāma karma, he could righteously
participate in the impending great war (cf. especially Chapters 2–3). “You are
entitled to [doing] the action,” Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a tells Arjuna in the Gītā, “never to its
consequences. Let not your motive be the fruit of the action, nor should you be bent
on inaction [when you ought to act]” (2.47).40 With regard to the overall intention of
such action, Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a teaches: “Just as the ignorant act attached to the action, Arjuna,
37 I have discussed these dharmas in my book, Hindus (2010), passim. Not one of these dharma codes or
manuals is viewed in the tradition as having intrinsic, paramount authority. All their conclusions are up
for debate. Thus, the contextual nature of dharma reigns on.
38 Matilal continues: “In verse 111, a selection procedure for these ten members was given: ‘The ten-
member assembly will be constituted by three scholars versed in the three Vedas…one logician
(haituka…), one dialectician or arguer (tarkī…), one expert in semantics and etymology (nairukta), one
scholar of the dharmaśāstras, and three laymen from three different groups, one celibate student…, one
house-holder…and one retired person…’ ” (2002c: 60; emphasis in original). Clearly, such a procedure
was not an everyday affair, but sanctioned by some higher authority for a particular purpose.
39 Professor Chakrabarti also discusses dharma as a concept that calls for mature discernment with
respect to competing pulls.
40 karmaṇy evādhikāras te mā phaleṣu kadācana | mā karmaphalahetur bhūr mā te saṅgo’stv akarmaṇi ||
(Bhagavad Gītā 2.47).
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so the wise person should act but as unattached, wanting the maintenance, the
bringing-together, of the world (lokasaṅgraha)” (3.25).41 In other words:
Since you must act, then do what the ignorant are doing, Arjuna—fight in the
battle. But being ignorant they’re fighting it for personal gain: wealth, revenge,
territorial greed, and they will suffer the due consequences. But you must fight
with no selfish motive in mind. As a righteous Ks
˙
atriya, or warrior, you must
do your duty in what can be envisaged as a dharmic war selflessly, for the
wellbeing of the world.
This is what dharma is for: the lokasaṅgraha, the bringing-together, of the whole
world.
Now we understand better why the everyday excuse, or the flat denial of a state of
affairs, whether the matter be great or small, is justified, when it is made as selflessly
as one can in the situation, for the genuine wellbeing of others, with the true purport
of dharma in mind. For here anṛtam qua non-truth is tantamount to telling the truth,
having the same effect that in typical circumstances the truth, or satyam, has,
namely, establishing true dharma. This is the mark of a mature morality and a
mature social order.42
Further, it is not necessary to be perfectly disciplined as morally selfless to act in
this way. That is not what Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a advises Arjuna to do, either in the Bhagavad Gītā
or in connection with the Kaus´ika anecdote. One must always seek to act for the
good of others as one’s decisive motive. If one continues in this vein, then in time
one will become more self-aware, and, guided by the relevant wisdom of the
experts, morally more and more other-regarding, more prone to making the right
decision even at short notice. This kind of pursuit of the truth with the welfare of
others as the driving motive, not only honors the truth, but also incorporates the
judicious cultivation of other moral goods, such as ahiṃsā, wisdom, self-restraint,
etc., into one’s moral calculus; for by bringing these goods into consideration and
weighing them up, one appreciates their proper place, relative to each other, in
context, developing in the process a sense of responsibility for the wellbeing of the
world. This approach ultimately ushers in the reign of true dharma.
It is in this way, then, that one could rightly say: satyam eva jayate: “Truth does
conquer all.” For, in this personal, comprehensive sense of “truth,”43 one has
become true to oneself and true to the situation at hand. One has developed integrity
—a sense of wholeness—not only with regard to oneself, but also with regard to the
welfare of others. Looking at Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a’s teaching in the round, one can say that this is
41 saktāḥ karmaṇy avidvāṃso yathā kurvanti bhārata | kuryād vidvāṃs tathāsaktaś cikīrṣur lokasaṅgra-
ham || (Bhagavad Gītā 3.25).
42 I am not theorizing on the kind of ethics this may imply, that is, consequentialist, utilitarian, rights
(adhikāra)-based, situational, etc. This would be the burden of a separate inquiry.
43 Again, I am not discussing the various theories of truth/error propagated by the various Hindu
philosophical systems: vivekākhyāti, viparītakhyāti, yathārthakhyāti, anyathākhyāti, and so on. This
would entail separate discussions.
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the goal of moral striving, namely, creating a sense of wholeness that incorporates
the wellbeing of the world (lokasaṅgraha).44
It is thus, I suggest, that “materially” (materialiter)—to use a logical term
favored in scholastic thinking—(traditional) Hinduism is a dharmic faith, that is, a
faith where dharma, or right living, is generally followed, and determined, with an
eye to context; not in a way where moral dictates are imposed inflexibly or
unconditionally from without, or with one’s own convenience or gain in mind, but
rather in the way of an integrated approach where an other-regarding moral
discipline, guided by attention to the wisdom of those who are duly expert,
prevails.45 But to give the pivotal Hindu term dharma only material content is not
enough; we must also give it formal content, that is, a sense of conceptual direction.
To this consideration, we now turn.
Dharma, in Hinduism, has never been a static concept. It has always been subject
to change in its connotation, and in his book, Resistant Hinduism, Richard Fox
Young has traced how this has taken place till modern times. Though he does this
with a historical eye to the eventual use of dharma in what he calls “Church
Sanskrit,” namely, that deployment of Sanskrit used by polemical Christians (such
as Muir), from about the nineteenth century, purporting to show the superiority of
Christianity as a “religion” in the sense of the Greek term, threskeia, namely,
“religion” as a distinctive and comprehensive way of life, he first reviews the
development of this term in the Indian tradition leading up to this understanding. To
this end, he alludes to the Jain use of dharma in an analogous sense.
One example in this vein from the Ks
˙
atracu¯d
˙
a¯man
˙
i, an eleventh-century text
written by Va¯dı¯bhasim
˙
ha, suffices.…Va¯dı¯bhasim
˙
ha there urges the man who
wants supreme beatitude to take refuge in the Jain religion (dharma), which is
likened to a lion that destroys elephants, a figurative expression for [the
refutation of] wrong doctrines… (Young 1981: 68).
As part of the same scenario, Hindus too used dharma in this comprehensive sense.
Alluding to research done by Joseph O’Connell, he points out that:
Gaud
˙
ı¯ya Vais
˙
n
˙
avas [in Bengal] sometimes used dharma as a word to express
their self-awareness over against other groups, especially Muslims.…
Instances of dharma compounded with hindu or hindura occur in the
Caitanyacarita¯mr
˙
ta and the Bhaktama¯la¯, Bengali texts belonging to the early
seventeenth and late eighteenth centuries respectively.…One can say…that
Gaudı¯ya Vais
˙
n
˙
avas found in dharma a useful word for distinguishing
themselves from non-Hindus at the social [namely, customs-related], if not
ideological, level (Young 1981: 67; emphasis in original).
44 Perhaps this also explains why “Maha¯tma¯” Gandhi, so intent on reinterpreting ahiṃsā, or non-
violence, through his life, could viscerally give his (incomplete) autobiography the title, The Story of my
Experiments with Truth (rather than “with Ahiṃsā/Nonviolence,” etc.). By grappling with, seeking
unwaveringly to discern—that is, by “experimenting” with—the truth in this sense, as representing his
dharma, he shaped his sense of integrity, through acts of courage, circumspection, and self-restraint. This
was an integrity that was intended to prioritize the wellbeing of the other in wider context (lokasaṅgraha).
45 Thus, Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a’s teaching relevant to the Kaus´ika anecdote, as well as in the Bhagavad Gītā, are included
as components of this guiding wisdom.
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Ta¯ntrikas in Bengal too, he continues, used the word dharma in a sense that
“designated both their praxis and conception of the divine” such that
its implication seems to be that only they possess dharma.…One finds,
therefore, that the Maha¯nirva¯n
˙
a [-tantra, a basic text of the kauladharma: “the
dharma of goddess Ka¯lı¯’s family”] extols itself as the dharma of dharmas:
“As the footmarks of all animals disappear in the footmarks of the elephant, so
do all Dharmas disappear in the Kula-Dharma”.…An expression such as this
is on the border line with θρησκεία [threskeia] (Young 1981: 67).
One can say that in all these cases, dharma in its generic sense connoted a
distinctive, comprehensive way of life, incorporating religious customs and
practices informed by a set (or sets) of beliefs that were both moral and—where
this applied—theological. For Hindus, dharma in its moral connotation here
continued to imply the making of judgments and decisions by way of attention to
context: this did not change in so far as all the subordinate dharmas mentioned
earlier continued to apply to the Hindu way of life in one way or another, even after
they increasingly became subject to reform through the influence of British rule.
The resulting development in the formal understanding of dharma accelerated as
the English-educated Bengali Hindu intelligentsia in the first instance (since
Calcutta was the seat of British paramountcy in the nineteenth century) engaged
more and more intensely with Western ideas via British rule. Yet, even then,
dharma as a generic concept did not lose its contextual emphasis. What was
becoming, rather, the subject of debate among the Bengali Hindu intelligentsia was
the term’s formal content in its connotation of an inclusive, distinctive Hindu way of
life. The notes of this content varied from one thinker to another as they debated this
issue, but the concept of dharma as applying to all that distinguished the Hindu way
of life, remained. Ankur Barua (2017) has given us a useful insight into this debate
as its trajectory unfolded. Referring to work done by A. P. Sen, Barua notes that
there “were at least 13 periodicals between 1840 and 1890 with the term dharma in
their titles…, where some of its significances received from the classical texts such
as the Dharma-śāstras were re-envisioned by members of the Hindu intelligentsia”
(2017: 2). Turning to particular thinkers, he says: “For them dharma was the basic
concept with which to define the boundaries of the Hindu self even as they sought to
modulate, alter, or recalibrate certain dhärmika sensibilities” (Barua 2017: 4). Thus,
the true dharma, argues [Chandranath] Basu [1844–1910]…, can be
summarised in four propositions—the infinitude of God (īśvara), the
Fatherhood of God, the freewill of human beings, and our love (prīti) of
God. This perfect dharma is, in fact, the Brahmo dharma…which is based on
the Upaniṣads, and which is the most advanced form of the Hindu dharma
(Barua 2017: 3, 8).
With regard to Bankimcandra Chatterji (whom we have encountered earlier),
Barua writes:
The fullness of the Hindu dharma is the devotional love taught by Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a in the
Bhagavad-gītā. The scriptural foundation of the Bhagavad-gītā provides
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Chatterjee with the tools for the form of religious humanism that he develops
in the Dharmatattva, according to which the essence of the Hindu dharma is a
form of culture (anuśīlana) which is the foundation of the four āśramas [, or
stages of life], and of the diverse vows, austerities, and rituals of Hindu life
(2017: 9).
We can refer to two more examples from Barua’s article. For Rajnarayan Basu
(1826–1899),
the Hindu dharma is universal, teaches the divine intimacy to the world, and
institutes distinctions between the spiritually mature and the spiritually
immature without excluding anyone, while Christianity and Islam are
insular…and fail to include all individuals within their doctrinal horizons
(Barua 2017: 6; emphasis added).
Whether we agree with this judgment contrasting two Abrahamic faiths with
Hinduism or not, to our purpose in particular are the words in italics which clearly
emphasize context for ascertaining dharma. In Barua’s analysis, Basu provides a
catalogue of twelve characteristics “that elevate the Hindu dharma above all the
other dharmas in the world” (2017: 7, cf. 6–8). Finally,
unlike Chatterjee, [Bhudeb] Mukhopadhyay [1827–1894] frames his interro-
gations of European notions and his articulations of the Hindu dharma with
the vocabulary not of modernised configurations of Hindu devotionalism but
of Advaita Veda¯nta.…[The] doctrine of the single self (ekajīvavāda), which
implies the interrelationality of all individuals, was accepted by the extremely
wise sages of the land, who believed that without the liberation (mukti) of all,
no individual could be liberated.…According to the true understanding of
equality in Hindu dharma, all human beings are fundamentally one (mulataḥ
eka) but are distinguished in accordance with their different karmic actions
(Barua 2017: 12, 12–13, 14).
Here, in accordance with Kr
˙
s
˙
n
˙
a’s advice mentioned in our discussion earlier,
Mukhopadhyay explicitly signals the importance of consulting the “extremely wise
sages of the land.” One could give many more examples of this modern attempt to
define Hinduism in terms of the material-formal distinction. In all these cases, while
dharma is materially a contextual concept, formally this contextuality must be
interrogated and acted upon by means of an ethic whose defining characteristics
(which vary from thinker to thinker) apply to all Hindus as a distinctive form of life.
I suggest, therefore, that to call Hinduism a dharmic faith today is to characterize
Hinduism in terms of these two dimensions: the pervasive contextual-material, and
the more specific defining-formal (qualifying the latter, of course, would depend on
the particular sources being considered). The combination of these two aspects
would set Hinduism—or perhaps more correctly, the particular Hindu way of life
under review—apart in its characterization as a dharmic faith.
This is where the comprehensive notion of “truth” we have been considering
comes in. Being “true” to dharma in this sense is being “true” to one’s being as a
person of integrity or wholeness, whose field of action has the wellbeing of the
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whole world in view, whereby the grand virtues of truth-telling, promise-keeping,
non-injury, self-restraint, generosity, and so on, that is, the virtues of the sanātana
(“eternal”) and sādharaṇa (“common”) dharma—plus any other qualities singled
out by the particular thinker under consideration—are duly combined, weighed up
relative to one another, and then implemented with the demands of the situation
confronting the agent in mind. Any attempt to make of Hinduism (or even a
particular branch of Hinduism) a sectarian or divisive faith with a code of practice
absolutized in terms of inflexible and exclusionary fiats, would run counter to the
comprehensive and universalizing connotation of dharma that has been developing
in “traditional Hinduism” till modern times (as reviewed by us). For according to
this development, we have not been dealing with a notion of dharma intended
ultimately only for a few, but with an ethic whose trajectory must eventually
embrace everyone in an egalitarian way.46 If the Upanis
˙
adic dicta—both of the
Muṇḍaka and of the Chāndogya—are to be given sympathetic consideration, then it
is thus, and only thus, that truth alone could indeed prevail, at least for Hinduism as
a dharmic faith.
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